Why do predicates like know embed both declarative and interrogative clauses, whereas closely related ones like believe only embed the former? The standard approach following Grimshaw (Linguist Inq 10:279–326, 1979) to this issue has been to specify lexically for each predicate which type of complement clause it can combine with. This view is challenged by predicates such as be certain, which embed interrogative clauses only in certain contexts. To deal with this issue, this paper proposes (i) a novel, unified semantics for declarative and interrogative embedding and (ii) a theory where embedding is constrained by semantic considerations. The reason for the apparent unembeddability of an interrogative clause under a given predicate is the resulting trivial meaning of the sentence. Such triviality manifests itself in unacceptability. Crucially, it is affected by both the lexical meaning of the predicate and the polarity of the sentence as a whole.

中文翻译：

---

琐碎和疑问句嵌入：上下文敏感性，事实性和否定性

为什么像know这样的谓词既嵌入了陈述性条款，又将疑问性词同时嵌入了，而像信念这样的紧密关联的谓词只嵌入了前者？Grimshaw（Linguist Inq 10：279–326，1979）遵循的标准方法是为每个谓词从词法上指定它可以与哪种补语子句组合。这种观点受到诸如肯定等谓词的挑战。，仅在某些情况下嵌入疑问句。为了解决这个问题，本文提出了（i）用于声明性和疑问性嵌入的新颖，统一的语义，以及（ii）语义受到限制的嵌入理论。在给定谓词下疑问句的明显不可嵌入性的原因是句子所产生的琐碎含义。这种琐碎的事表现为无法接受。至关重要的是，它受到谓词的词汇含义和整个句子的极性的影响。