Using unique data from a medical typing unit (2011–2014), this paper empirically explores the influence of performance pay on employee productivity in a risk-less low incentive intensity environment. We analyze a routine task performed by lower-level employees. We analyze a setting with strong sectoral agreements and thus a clear (and comparatively high) basic wage level set by the general collective bargaining agreement. We find that despite the risk-less design and low incentive intensity of the setting, switching employees from fixed wages to partially performance-based compensation (PPBC) significantly increases the number of typed pages by 9.53%. Over a one-year period, this rate of increase translates into approximately one additional month of output at a fraction of the usual cost. We also find that these results do not disappear over time. In contrast, the observed gains split into an initial increase in productivity following the switch to PPBC (+3.25%) and additional gains while an employee remains on PPBC. Therefore, we assume that a type of learning begins once an employee switches to PPBC and that this learning is the most pronounced during the first months following the change in compensation. Furthermore, we find no evidence of potentially misplaced incentives in the selection of tasks by the employees (i.e., cherry picking) and no indications of reduced quality.

本文使用来自医疗分类单位（2011-2014年）的独特数据，从经验上探索了绩效薪酬在无风险，低激励强度环境下对员工生产力的影响。我们分析了下级员工执行的日常任务。我们分析了具有强有力的部门协议的环境，因此分析了总体集体谈判协议所设定的清晰（且相对较高）的基本工资水平。我们发现，尽管设计无风险且设置的激励强度很低，但是将员工从固定工资转换为部分基于绩效的薪酬（PPBC）可以显着增加打字页面的数量9.53％。在一年的时间内，这种增长率转化为大约一个多月的产出，而费用仅为通常成本的一小部分。我们还发现，这些结果不会随着时间消失。相比之下，观察到的收益分为转换为PPBC后的初始生产率提高（+ 3.25％）和雇员继续使用PPBC时的额外收益。因此，我们假设一旦雇员转用PPBC，便开始一种学习方式，并且这种学习在薪酬变动后的头几个月中最为明显。此外，我们没有发现任何证据表明员工在选择任务时可能会错位激励（即摘樱桃），也没有迹象表明质量下降。我们假设一旦雇员转用PPBC，便开始一种学习方式，并且这种学习在薪酬变动后的头几个月中最为明显。此外，我们没有发现任何证据表明员工在选择任务时可能会错位激励（即摘樱桃），也没有迹象表明质量下降。我们假设一旦雇员转用PPBC，便开始一种学习方式，并且这种学习在薪酬变动后的头几个月中最为明显。此外，我们没有发现任何证据表明员工在选择任务时可能会错位激励（即摘樱桃），也没有迹象表明质量下降。