Abstract This study examined the strategic planning process used in U.S. public company boardrooms, with a particular focus on companies that used board-level Strategic Planning Committees (SPCs) as opposed to those that engaged the full board in strategic planning oversight (which we call “strategic planning overall” or “SPO” firms). Based on interviews with 8 SPC members and 12 directors from SPO firms, we found a number of similarities in SPC and SPO processes, as well as a number of key differences. Overall, it is clear that there often can be a fundamental tension between management and directors with respect to the responsibility for strategic planning. There also can be significant information asymmetries arising from agency theoretic assumptions requiring board independence and arms-length interactions. Organizational scope may, within limits, constrain these assumptions. Such conditions increase both resource and information processing demands on the board, creating a need for greater formality in the board's strategic planning processes. These demands increase the need for paradoxical approaches that can accommodate greater flexibility in board-management interactions. The paradox lies in the board's ability to simultaneously meet and balance agency theoretic, resource dependence based and information processing demands. The contrasting organizational logics that are in play result in paradoxes that influence whether and in what form a board-level SPC should be constituted. The evidence suggests that constituting and structuring SPCs to embrace more collaborative interactions between the board and management could be helpful in dealing with the contrasting requirements and tensions that arise in certain firms. Embracing paradoxes and modifying governance approaches to include collaborative interactions with management may also help in ensuring that the board's strategic planning processes are equipped to deal with the challenges that confront the organization. Ultimately, individual company directors will need to determine whether and in what form a board-level SPC would add value to their governance structure and processes. Our interview-based evidence suggests that firm size and director experience are important considerations in the choice of how the board should oversee strategy.

中文翻译：

---

美国上市公司董事会的战略规划委员会：公理还是自相矛盾？

摘要 本研究考察了美国上市公司董事会中使用的战略规划流程，特别关注那些使用董事会级战略规划委员会 (SPC) 的公司，而不是那些让全体董事会参与战略规划监督的公司（我们称之为“总体战略规划”或“SPO”公司）。基于对来自 SPO 公司的 8 位 SPC 成员和 12 位董事的采访，我们发现了 SPC 和 SPO 流程中的许多相似之处，以及一些主要差异。总的来说，很明显，管理层和董事之间经常会在战略规划的责任方面存在根本性的紧张关系。代理理论假设要求董事会独立和公平互动，也可能导致严重的信息不对称。组织范围可能，在限制范围内，限制这些假设。这种情况增加了董事会对资源和信息处理的需求，从而需要在董事会的战略规划过程中更加正式。这些需求增加了对矛盾方法的需求，这些方法可以在董事会与管理层的互动中提供更大的灵活性。矛盾在于董事会同时满足和平衡代理理论、基于资源依赖和信息处理需求的能力。正在发挥作用的对比性组织逻辑导致了影响是否以及应以何种形式构成董事会级 SPC 的悖论。证据表明，组建和构建 SPC 以在董事会和管理层之间进行更多的协作互动可能有助于处理某些公司中出现的对比要求和紧张局势。接受悖论并修改治理方法以包括与管理层的协作互动也可能有助于确保董事会的战略规划流程具备应对组织面临的挑战的能力。最终，个别公司董事将需要确定董事会级别的 SPC 是否以及以何种形式为其治理结构和流程增加价值。我们基于访谈的证据表明，在选择董事会应如何监督战略时，公司规模和董事经验是重要的考虑因素。