Within MNCs’ foreign subsidiaries financial slack, i.e., uncommitted financial resources in excess of those needed for current operations, may incur costs for headquarters. These costs may emanate from subsidiaries' decision to forego investment opportunities and stockpile cash instead, which, in turn, may lead to fewer resources being available for redistribution within the organization. From an agency theory perspective, headquarters can minimize these costs through monitoring mechanisms. While agency theory is considered theoretically appropriate for the study of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship, it reflects a rather undersocialized manifestation of human behaviour, which in turn limits its applicability. In this paper, we attempt to address this limitation by suggesting and empirically exploring that the effect of monitoring mechanisms is dependent (1) on the different types of monitoring used, and (2) on subsidiaries' external embeddedness. Drawing on empirical evidence from 94 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals operating in Greece, we provide some initial evidence on the differential impact of monitoring through expatriates and monitoring through bureaucratic processes. Most importantly, we show that subsidiaries' structural embeddedness moderates both associations. In doing so, we reveal that whether subsidiaries behave opportunistically or as good citizens is partially determined by the social context in which they are embedded. An unexpected finding concerns the positive effect of the origin of the CEO on subsidiaries' financial slack for expatriates compared to local managers. This finding underscores the importance of the CEO identity, and highlights the need for future research exploring its effect on subsidiaries' performance.

中文翻译：

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总部监控机制、子公司财务宽松与子公司外部嵌入的或有作用


跨国公司的外国子公司内部的财务闲置，即未承诺的财务资源超过当前运营所需的资金，可能会给总部带来成本。这些成本可能源于子公司决定放弃投资机会并储备现金，这反过来又可能导致组织内可用于重新分配的资源减少。从代理理论的角度来看，总部可以通过监控机制将这些成本降到最低。虽然代理理论在理论上被认为适合研究总部与子公司的关系，但它反映了人类行为的一种相当社会化的表现，这反过来又限制了它的适用性。在本文中，我们试图通过建议和实证探索来解决这一局限性，即监控机制的效果取决于（1）所使用的不同类型的监控，以及（2）子公司的外部嵌入性。我们借鉴在希腊经营的外国跨国公司 94 家子公司的经验证据，提供了一些初步证据，说明通过外籍人员进行监控和通过官僚程序进行监控的不同影响。最重要的是，我们表明子公司的结构嵌入性调节了这两种关联。在此过程中，我们发现子公司的行为是机会主义的还是好公民的行为部分取决于它们所处的社会背景。一个意想不到的发现涉及外籍管理人员与本地管理人员相比，首席执行官的出身对子公司财务宽松的积极影响。这一发现强调了首席执行官身份的重要性，并强调了未来研究探索其对子公司绩效影响的必要性。