The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression remains the same after substitution of synonymous expressions. Alleged counterexamples to compositionality seem to force a theoretical choice: either apparent synonyms are not synonyms or synonyms do not syntactically occur where they appear to occur. Some theorists have instead looked to Frege’s doctrine of “reference shift” according to which the meaning of an expression is sensitive to its linguistic context. This doctrine is alleged to retain the relevant claims about synonymy and substitution while respecting the compositionality principle. Thus, Salmon (Philos Rev 115(4):415, 2006 ) and Glanzberg and King (Philosophers’ Imprint 20(2):1–29, 2020 ) offer occurrence-based accounts of variable binding, and Pagin and Westerståhl (Linguist Philos 33(5):381–415, 2010c ) argue that an occurrence-based semantics delivers a compositional account of quotation. Our thesis is this: the occurrence-based strategies resolve the apparent failures of substitutivity in the same general way as the standard expression-based semantics do. So it is a myth that a Frege-inspired occurrence-based semantics affords a genuine alternative strategy.

中文翻译：

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基于出现的语义的神话

组合性原则要求同义词替换后，复杂词的含义保持不变。所谓的组合性反例似乎迫使一个理论选择：要么明显的同义词不是同义词，要么同义词没有在它们出现的地方在句法上出现。一些理论家转而关注弗雷格的“指称转移”学说，根据该学说，表达的含义对其语言上下文敏感。据称，该学说在尊重组合性原则的同时保留了有关同义词和替换的相关主张。因此，Salmon (Philos Rev 115(4):415, 2006 ) 和 Glanzberg and King (Philosophers' Imprint 20(2):1–29, 2020 ) 提供了基于事件的变量绑定说明，而 Pagin 和 Westerståhl (Linguist Philos 33(5):381–415, 2010c ) 认为基于事件的语义提供了引文的组合说明。我们的论点是：基于事件的策略以与标准基于表达式的语义相同的一般方式解决了替代性的明显失败。因此，受 Frege 启发的基于事件的语义提供真正的替代策略是一个神话。