A plausible principle about the felicitous use of indicative conditionals says that there is something strange about asserting an indicative conditional when you know whether its antecedent is true. But in most contexts there is nothing strange at all about asserting indicative conditionals like ‘If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, then someone else did’. This paper argues that the only compelling explanation of these facts requires the resources of contextualism about knowledge.

中文翻译：

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面对阴谋条件的知识

关于恰当使用指示性条件句的一个看似合理的原则说，当您知道其先行词是否为真时，断言指示性条件句会有些奇怪。但是在大多数情况下，断言诸如“如果奥斯瓦尔德没有射杀肯尼迪，那么其他人会射杀”等指示性条件并没有什么奇怪的。本文认为，对这些事实的唯一令人信服的解释需要关于知识的语境主义资源。