Kit Fine (2017) distinguishes between inexact and exact truthmaking. He argues that the former can be defined from the latter, but not vice versa, and so concludes that truthmaker semanticists should treat the exact variety of truthmaking as primitive. I argue that this gets things backwards. We can define exact truthmaking in terms of inexact truthmaking and we can’t define inexact truthmaking in terms of exact truthmaking. I conclude that it’s inexact truthmaking, rather than exact truthmaking, that truthmaker semanticists should treat as the primitive semantic relation.

中文翻译：

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请求不准确的真相

Kit Fine (2017) 区分了不准确和准确的真相。他认为可以从后者定义前者，但反之则不然，因此得出结论，真理制造者语义学家应该将真理制造的确切种类视为原始的。我认为这会让事情倒退。我们可以根据不准确的真相制作来定义准确的真相制作，而我们不能根据准确的真相制作来定义不准确的真相制作。我的结论是，真相制造者语义学家应该将其视为不精确的真相制作，而不是精确的真相制作。