Epistemic contextualism in the style of Lewis (in Aust J Philos 74:549–567, 1996) maintains that ascriptions of knowledge to a subject vary in truth with the alternatives that can be eliminated by the subject’s evidence in a context. Schaffer (in Philos Stud 119:73–103, 2004, in Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:235–271, 2005, in Philos Phenomenol Res 75:383–403, 2007, in Philos Issues 18(1):1–19, 2008, in: Schaffer, Loewer (eds) A companion to David Lewis, pp 473–490. Wiley, Hoboken, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (in Nous 46:675–708, 2012), and Schaffer and Szabo (in Philos Stud 168(2):491–543, 2014) hold that the question under discussion or qud always determines these alternatives in a context. This paper shows that the qud does not perform such a role for know and uses this result to draw a few lessons about the metasemantics of context-sensitivity.

中文翻译：

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知道的元语义不是什么

刘易斯风格的认知语境主义（在 Aust J Philos 74:549-567, 1996）坚持认为，知识对主体的归属在真理上有所不同，而替代物可以通过主体在上下文中的证据来消除。Schaffer（在 Philos Stud 119:73–103, 2004，在 Oxford Stud Epistemol 1:235–271, 2005，在 Philos Phenomenol Res 75:383–403，2007，在 Philos Issues 18(1):1–18, 20 , in: Schaffer, Loewer (eds) A partner to David Lewis, pp 473–490. Wiley, Hoboken, 2015), Schaffer and Knobe (in Nous 46:675–708, 2012), and Schaffer and Szabo (in Philos Stud 168(2):491–543, 2014) 认为讨论中的问题或 qud 总是在上下文中决定这些替代方案。这篇论文表明 qud 并没有扮演这样的角色，并使用这个结果来吸取一些关于上下文敏感的元语义的教训。