Traditional arguments against the identification of the language of thought with natural language assume a picture of natural language which is largely inconsistent with that suggested by contemporary linguistic theory. This has led certain philosophers and linguists to suggest that this identification is not as implausible as it once seemed. In this paper, I discuss the prospects for such an identification in light of these developments in linguistic theory. I raise a new challenge against the identification thesis: the existence of ungrammatical but acceptable expressions seems to require a gap between thought and language. I consider what must be the case in order for this objection to be dealt with.

中文翻译：

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自然语言成为思想语言意味着什么？

反对将思维语言等同于自然语言的传统论点假设了自然语言的图景，这与当代语言学理论所建议的大不相同。这导致某些哲学家和语言学家认为这种认定并不像以前看起来的那样令人难以置信。在本文中，我根据语言学理论的这些发展讨论了这种识别的前景。我对认同论提出了一个新的挑战：不合语法但可接受的表达的存在似乎需要思想和语言之间的差距。我认为必须是什么情况才能处理这一反对意见。