Gig work and other flexible labour practices have been subject to unprecedented levels of attention recently. While this topic has attracted significant interest from employment lawyers, it remains relatively underexplored from other pertinent legal and inter-disciplinary angles. This paper will adopt an alternative perspective on flexible work inspired by Coase's theory of the firm. Focusing on the implications of flexible work for the relative allocation of control, risk and reward within the firm, it will highlight how both task-oriented (gig) and on-demand (casual) work practices typically entail workers assuming most of the positional disadvantages associated with orthodox employment and self-employment, while enjoying none or few of the corresponding advantages. Using a hypothetical contract analysis, it will highlight the structural similarity between flexible work and unsecured financial investments in business firms by reference to key strands of institutional economics and law and finance literature. On this basis, it will enquire as to optimal forms of compensation that rational flexible workers can (counter-factually) be regarded as bargaining for in the absence of impediments to efficient contracting, and as the price for trading off their traditional employment guarantees.

中文翻译：

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零工经济：假设的合同分析

最近，零工工作和其他灵活的劳动实践受到了前所未有的关注。虽然这个话题引起了就业律师的极大兴趣，但从其他相关的法律和跨学科角度来看，它仍然相对未被充分探索。本文将采用受科斯公司理论启发的灵活工作的另一种观点。重点关注灵活工作对公司内控制权、风险和回报的相对分配的影响，它将强调以任务为导向（零工）和按需（临时）工作实践通常如何让员工承担大部分职位劣势与正统的就业和自营职业相关，而没有或很少享受相应的优势。使用假设合同分析，它将通过参考制度经济学和法律和金融文献的关键部分，强调灵活工作和对商业公司的无担保金融投资之间的结构相似性。在此基础上，它将询问理性的弹性工人可以（反事实地）在没有阻碍有效合同的情况下讨价还价的最佳补偿形式，以及权衡其传统就业保障的价格。