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Setting Precedents Without Making Norms?
Law and Philosophy ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-09 , DOI: 10.1007/s10982-020-09383-6
Katharina Stevens

Some authors argue that the rule-of-law ideal gives judges a prima facie duty to provide a determinate formulation of the precedent’s general norm in all their precedent-opinions. I question that claim. I agree that judges have a duty to decide their cases based on reasons and that they should formulate these reasons in their opinions. I also agree that formulations of general norms should be the goal of common-law development and that judges have a duty to contribute to the realization of this goal. However, I argue that judges may sometimes do so better if they do not provide a determinate formulation of a general norm in their opinion. Often, judges may not feel confident that they are able to formulate a good general norm for their precedent decision, even if they believe that their decision is both correct and justifiable through argument. In this case, various reasons speak against providing a determinate formulation of a general norm, including rule-of-law reasons.

中文翻译:

在不制定规范的情况下树立先例?

一些作者争辩说,法治理想赋予法官一项表面上的责任,即在其所有判例意见中对判例的一般规范提供确定的表述。我质疑这种说法。我同意法官有责任根据理由来决定他们的案件,并且他们应该在他们的意见中阐明这些理由。我也同意一般规范的制定应该是普通法发展的目标,法官有责任为实现这一目标做出贡献。然而,我认为,如果法官在他们的意见中不提供一般规范的确定表述,他们有时可能会做得更好。通常,法官可能对他们能够为他们的先例决定制定一个良好的一般规范没有信心,即使他们相信他们的决定是正确的,并且通过论证是合理的。
更新日期:2020-04-09
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