The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I defend and expand the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment (FTP). Second, I argue that this theory implies that non-consensual neurointerventions – interventions that act directly on one’s brain – are permissible. According to the FTP, punishment is justified as a way of ensuring that citizens who infringe their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their moral powers will thereafter be able to comply with it. I claim that the FTP ought to be expanded to include citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. Thus, states must ensure that their citizens develop their moral reliability, not only because they must enforce their citizens’ compliance with certain duties, but also because states have the duty to maintain the conditions for stability and satisfy their citizens’ interest in developing their moral powers. According to this account of the FTP, if neurointerventions are the only or best way of ensuring that offenders can discharge their fortificational duties, states have strong reasons to provide these interventions.

中文翻译：

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作为道德强化和非自愿神经干预的惩罚

本文的目的是双重的。首先，我捍卫并扩展了强化主义惩罚理论（FTP）。其次，我认为这个理论意味着未经同意的神经干预——直接作用于一个人的大脑的干预——是允许的。根据 FTP，惩罚是正当的，以确保违反义务的公民能够遵守其证明其道德力量的可靠性的义务。我声称 FTP 应该扩展到包括公民在发展他们的道德力量方面的兴趣。因此，国家必须确保其公民发展其道德可靠性，不仅因为它们必须强制其公民遵守某些义务，也因为国家有责任维持稳定的条件并满足其公民在发展其道德力量方面的利益。根据 FTP 的这一说明，如果神经干预是确保罪犯能够履行其设防职责的唯一或最佳方式，那么国家有充分的理由提供这些干预。