Recently, Gerhard Overland and Alec Walen have developed novel and interesting theories of nonconsequentialism. Unlike other nonconsequentialist theories such as the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), each of their theories denies that an agent’s mental states are (fundamentally) relevant for determining how stringent their moral reasons are against harming others. Instead, Overland and Walen seek to distinguish morally between instances of harming in terms of the circumstances of the people who will be harmed, rather than in features of the agent doing the harming. In this paper, we argue that these theories yield counterintuitive verdicts across a broad range of cases that other nonconsequentialist theories (including the DDE) handle with relative ease. We also argue that Walen’s recent attempt to reformulate this type of theory so that it does not have such implications is unsuccessful.

中文翻译：

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对最近一些以受害者为中心的非结果主义理论的批判

最近，格哈德·欧弗兰 (Gerhard Overland) 和亚历克·瓦伦 (Alec Walen) 开发了新颖有趣的非结果主义理论。与其他非结果主义理论（如双重效应学说 (DDE)）不同，他们的每一个理论都否认代理人的心理状态（从根本上）与确定他们的道德理由反对伤害他人的严格程度有关。相反，欧弗兰和瓦伦试图根据将受到伤害的人的情况，而不是根据进行伤害的代理人的特征，在道德上区分伤害的实例。在本文中，我们认为这些理论在其他非结果主义理论（包括 DDE）相对容易处理的广泛案例中产生了违反直觉的结论。