Judges decide cases by appeal to rules of general application they deem to be law. If a candidate rule resolves the case and is, ex ante and independently of the judge’s judgment, the law, then the judge has a legal obligation to declare it as such and follow it. That, at any rate, is conventional wisdom. Yet the principle is false – a rule’s being law or the judge’s believing it to be law is neither necessary nor even sufficient for a judge being legally obliged to follow it. The principle’s falsity is especially apparent in so-called hard cases, where the line between legal and non-legal rules is obscure. Moreover, judges have authority to disregard law in hard cases not because moral (or non-legal) obligations trump legal obligations. Rather, the law itself circumscribes its own authority. The implications for legal philosophy are significant; for one, a theory of juridical norms can be developed independently of the precise boundaries of legality.

中文翻译：

---

法律义务及其限制

法官通过上诉到他们认为是法律的普遍适用的规则来裁决案件。如果候选规则解决了案件，并且在事前且独立于法官的判决和法律，那么法官有法律义务宣布并遵守法律。无论如何，这是传统智慧。然而，这条原则是错误的——规则就是法律或法官相信它是法律对于法官在法律上有义务遵守它既不是必要的，也不是充分的。该原则的错误在所谓的困难案例中尤为明显，在这种情况下，法律规则和非法律规则之间的界限是模糊的。此外，法官有权在疑难案件中无视法律，不是因为道德（或非法律）义务胜过法律义务。相反，法律本身限制了它自己的权威。对法律哲学的影响是重大的；