Abstract We evaluate the frequency and form of legislative responses to Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the assumption that the legal basis of the Court’s decision will determine the form of congressional response. Studies of Congress–Court interaction have often argued or assumed that Congress will respond to constitutional decisions with Court-curbing measures and to statutory decisions with policy-based measures, but recent scholarship suggests this distinction may be overstated. We introduce a new strategy for identifying policy-based responses and use new data to subject the conventional wisdom to empirical evaluation. In the period under consideration here (1997 to 2012), we find that the Court’s statutory decisions appear to be nearly immune to Court-curbing attempts but are regularly targeted with policy-based responses, while a subset of constitutional cases (those that invalidate policies) are doubly vulnerable, triggering the introduction of Court-curbing bills and successful policy-based responses.

中文翻译：

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国会对最高法院宪法和法定裁决的回应

摘要 我们评估立法对最高法院决定作出回应的频率和形式，以评估法院决定的法律基础将决定国会回应形式的假设。国会与法院互动的研究经常争论或假设国会将通过法院限制措施回应宪法决定，并通过基于政策的措施回应法定决定，但最近的研究表明，这种区别可能被夸大了。我们引入了一种新策略来识别基于政策的响应，并使用新数据将传统智慧置于实证评估之下。在此处所考虑的时期（1997 年至 2012 年），我们发现法院的法定决定似乎几乎不受法院遏制企图的影响，但经常以基于政策的回应为目标，