Abstract I examine the quintessential member of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, in the context of the separation of powers (SOP). As the leader and public face of the Court, the chief is more likely than his colleagues to be cognizant of the institution's legitimacy. Chiefs also hold the important procedural power of assigning opinions when they are in the majority. Given these conditions, I argue that the SOP constrains chief justices’ opinion assignment decisions. Specifically, I find that chief justices are significantly less likely to assign opinions to their ideological allies when the Court faces increased institutional constraint or heightened public discontent. However, these SOP effects are conditioned on the decision authority of the case – they are only constraints in statutory cases. By linking the Court’s external strategic game (SOP) to its internal strategic game, this finding adds nuance of conditionality to the legitimacy-maintenance behavior of the Court and furthers scholars’ understanding of the goals and constraints that affect chief justices’ opinion assignment decisions.

中文翻译：

---

美国首席大法官意见分配的三权分立模式

摘要 我在三权分立 (SOP) 的背景下考察了最高法院的典型成员、首席大法官。作为法院的领导者和公众形象，院长比他的同事更有可能认识到该机构的合法性。酋长在占多数时还拥有分配意见的重要程序权力。鉴于这些条件，我认为 SOP 限制了首席大法官的意见分配决定。具体来说，我发现当法院面临更多的制度约束或公众不满时，首席大法官不太可能将意见分配给他们的意识形态盟友。但是，这些 SOP 效果取决于案件的决策权限——它们只是在法定案件中的约束。