Abstract Legislative proposals that attack or curb state supreme courts are often introduced in state legislatures. However, the causes of state court curbing legislation have not been systematically analyzed. This article seeks to expand on existing knowledge of court curbing by examining what causes some U.S. state legislators to introduce court curbing bills. I develop a theoretical argument that court curbing is driven by court–legislator ideological distance and legislator electoral security. I demonstrate that legislators who are ideologically distant from their state supreme court and electorally secure introduce the most court curbing legislation.

中文翻译：

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州议会中的法院遏制：为什么州立法者攻击他们的法院

摘要 攻击或遏制州最高法院的立法提案经常被引入州立法机构。然而，州法院遏制立法的原因尚未得到系统分析。本文旨在通过研究导致美国一些州立法者引入法院限制法案的原因来扩展有关法院限制的现有知识。我提出了一个理论论点，即法院遏制是由法院与立法者的意识形态距离和立法者选举安全驱动的。我证明，在意识形态上远离州最高法院并且选举安全的立法者引入了最多的法院限制立法。