This study examines how the decisions of the elderly with respect to work, retirement, and hours to work relate to the public pension and other relevant programs by constructing a single index of implicit tax that incorporates various factors related to institutional disincentives to working in Japan. Our regression model underscores that public pension and other related programs, taken together, discourage the elderly from working. Based on the regression results, we conduct simulations to show the extent to which the three policy reforms can encourage the elderly to stay in the labor force longer and work longer hours: (1) abolishing the earnings test for pension benefits; (2) raising the eligibility age for pension benefits; and (3) extending the wage subsidy for the elderly. The simulation results highlight the relative effectiveness of raising the eligibility age.

本研究通过构建一个隐含税的单一指标，该指标综合了与在日本工作的制度性诱因相关的各种因素，研究了老年人在工作，退休和工作时间方面的决定与公共养老金和其他相关计划之间的关系。我们的回归模型强调，将公共养老金和其他相关计划结合在一起，会阻止老年人工作。根据回归结果，我们进行模拟，以显示这三项政策改革在多大程度上可以鼓励老年人在劳动力市场中停留更长的时间和更长的工作时间：（1）取消对养老金福利的收入测试；（二）提高退休金的领取年龄；（三）扩大老年人工资补贴。