Abstract

We provide the first analysis of the risk-sharing implications of altruism networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about each other. We explore whether altruistic transfers help smooth consumption and how this depends on the shape of the network. We find that altruism networks have a first-order impact on risk. Altruistic transfers generate efficient insurance when the network of perfect altruistic ties is strongly connected. We uncover two specific empirical implications of altruism networks. First, bridges can generate good overall risk sharing, and, more generally, the quality of informal insurance depends on the average path length of the network. Second, large shocks are well-insured by connected altruism networks. By contrast, large shocks tend to be badly insured in models of informal insurance with frictions. We characterize what happens for shocks that leave the structure of giving relationships unchanged. We further explore the relationship between consumption variance and centrality, correlation in consumption streams across agents, and the impact of adding links.

中文翻译：

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网络中的利他主义和风险分担

摘要

我们首次分析了利他主义网络的风险分担影响。代理嵌入固定网络并相互关心。我们探索利他转移是否有助于平滑消费，以及这如何取决于网络的形状。我们发现利他主义网络对风险有一级影响。当完美的利他关系网络紧密相连时，利他转移会产生有效的保险。我们揭示了利他主义网络的两个具体经验含义。首先，桥梁可以产生良好的整体风险分担，更一般地说，非正式保险的质量取决于网络的平均路径长度。其次，相互连接的利他主义网络可以很好地确保大冲击。相比之下，在具有摩擦的非正式保险模型中，大型冲击往往得不到很好的保障。我们描述了使捐赠关系结构保持不变的冲击会发生什么。我们进一步探讨了消费差异和中心性之间的关系、跨代理的消费流的相关性以及添加链接的影响。