We study nancial stability regulation in an environment with pecuniary externalities and where banks face both a liability choice (between private money creation and long-term borrowing) and an asset choice (between liquid and illiquid investments). Return risk on illiquid assets gives rise to liquidity risk, because banks that learn to have low future returns nd themselves unable to roll over ‘money-like’ debt. Privately optimal borrowing and investment decisions by banks lead, in general, to socially inef cient outcomes. The nature of inef ciency depends critically on the degree to which liquidity risk is systemic: When risk is highly systemic, banks hold the socially optimal amount of liquid assets, but create an excessive amount of money and overinvest in risky assets; when risk is not highly systemic, banks hold too little liquidity, create insuf cient private money and underinvest in risky assets. Quantityand price-based regulations to address the identi ed inef ciencies are discussed. (JEL: E44, E58, G21, G28)

中文翻译：

---

借款和流动性外部性下的金融稳定法规

我们在存在金钱外部性的环境中研究金融稳定监管，在这种环境中，银行既面临负债选择（在私人货币创造和长期借款之间）又面临资产选择（在流动和非流动投资之间）。非流动性资产的收益风险带来了流动性风险，因为学会了低收益的银行发现自己无法结转“类似金钱”的债务。银行的私人最优借贷和投资决策通常会导致社会效率低下的结果。低效率的性质主要取决于流动性风险的系统性程度：当风险高度系统性时，银行持有社会上最优的流动资产，但会产生过多的货币并过度投资于风险资产。当风险不是高度系统性时，银行的流动性太少，造成私人资金不足，对风险资产的投资不足。讨论了基于数量和价格的法规，以解决所识别的低效率问题。（JEL：E44，E58，G21，G28）