当前位置: X-MOL 学术J. Eur. Econ. Assoc. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Commitment and (in) Efficiency: A Bargaining Experiment
Journal of the European Economic Association ( IF 3.9 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-21 , DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvaa012
Marina Agranov 1 , Matt Elliott 2
Affiliation  

We conduct an experimental investigation of decentralized bargaining over the terms of trade in matching markets. We study if/when efficient matches are reached, and the terms of trade agreed upon. We find that mismatch is extensive, and persists as we change the nature of bargaining by moving from a structured experimental protocol to permitting free-form negotiations. We identify two sources of inefficiencies. Inefficiencies are driven by (a) players' rational responses to their bargaining positions changing as others reach agreement, and (b) the existence of players who are unwilling to accept low, inequitable payoffs.

中文翻译:

承诺和效率:讨价还价的实验

我们对匹配市场中的贸易条款进行了分散议价的实验研究。我们研究是否/何时达到有效匹配,并商定贸易条件。我们发现不匹配是广泛的,并且随着我们通过从结构化的实验协议转向允许自由形式的谈判来改变讨价还价的性质而持续存在。我们确定了效率低下的两个原因。效率低下的原因是:(a)参与者对讨价还价立场的理性反应随着他人达成共识而改变;(b)那些不愿接受低,不公平回报的参与者。
更新日期:2020-04-21
down
wechat
bug