Popular protests and palace coups are the two domestic threats to dictators. We show that free media, which informs citizens about their rulers, is a double-edged sword that alleviates one threat, but exacerbates the other. Informed citizens may protest against a ruler, but they may also protest to restore her after a palace coup. We develop a model in which citizens engage in a regime-change global game, and media freedom is a ruler’s instrument for Bayesian persuasion, used to manage the competing risks of coups and protests. A coup switches the status quo from being in the ruler’s favor to being against her. This introduces convexities in the ruler’s Bayesian persuasion problem, causing her to benefit from an informed citizenry. Rulers tolerate freer press when citizens are pessimistic about them, or coups signal information about them to citizens.

中文翻译：

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政变阴影下的媒体自由

民众抗议和宫廷政变是国内对独裁者的两大威胁。我们表明，让公民了解他们的统治者的自由媒体是一把双刃剑，可以减轻一个威胁，但加剧另一个威胁。知情的公民可能会抗议一位统治者，但他们也可能会在宫廷政变后抗议恢复她的统治。我们开发了一个模型，让公民参与政权更迭的全球游戏，媒体自由是贝叶斯说服的统治者工具，用于管理政变和抗议的竞争风险。政变将现状从有利于统治者转变为反对她。这在统治者的贝叶斯说服问题中引入了凸性，使她从知情的公民中受益。当公民对他们感到悲观时，统治者会容忍更自由的新闻，