Abstract

Reputation concerns can discipline agents and generate good outcomes. But what if outcomes are not always observed? Infrequent observation can strengthen reputation incentives and encourage effort. By exerting effort when outcomes are more likely observed, an agent can improve her reputation and gain by “coasting” on this reputation by shirking when the audience is less likely to be observing her actions. Opportunities to coast can in fact lead to greater overall effort than constant observation. We consider Markov information structures and characterize the observability structure that maximizes efficient effort.

中文翻译：

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声誉与滑行的机会

摘要

声誉问题可以约束代理商并产生良好的结果。但是，如果不总是观察到结果怎么办？很少观察可以加强声誉激励并鼓励努力。通过在更可能观察到结果时付出努力，代理可以通过在观众不太可能观察其行为的情况下进行回避来“夸大”此声誉，从而提高其声誉和收益。实际上，与不断观察相比，沿海航行的机会可能导致更大的总体努力。我们考虑马尔可夫信息结构并描述可观察性结构，该结构可最大程度地提高效率。