We test whether human capital deterioration is a function of employer decision making with respect to workload allocation. We examine this question in the context of National Football League running backs, where the structure of nonguaranteed employment contracts has the potential to create divergent incentives for franchises and players. We empirically test how employer-assigned workloads impact changes in player productivity and career length. We find that larger employer-assigned workloads result in larger decreases in future productivity. However, players assigned larger workloads tend to have longer careers. These results suggest deleterious physical effects from increased workloads while also implying hiring decisions are partially based on status or exposure effects.

中文翻译：

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雇主分配的工作量和人力资本恶化：来自国家橄榄球联盟的证据

我们测试人力资本恶化是否与雇主在工作量分配方面的决策有关。我们在全国足球联赛倒退的背景下研究这个问题，在这种情况下，无保证的雇佣合同的结构有可能对特许经营权和球员产生不同的激励。我们根据经验测试了雇主分配的工作量如何影响球员生产率和职业生涯的变化。我们发现，更大的雇主分配工作量会导致未来生产力的更大下降。但是，分配更大工作量的玩家往往会有更长的职业生涯。这些结果表明，工作量增加会带来有害的物理影响，同时也暗示招聘决策部分取决于状态或暴露影响。