This paper offers a DRT-based analysis of epistemic specificity. Following Farkas (1996), we distinguish between scopal, partitive and epistemic specificity. After arguing in Section 1 that the three main variants of specificity are irreducible to each other, the paper then focuses on epistemic specificity. In the analysis of epistemically specific indefinites we distinguish between specific use and specific interpretation. Specific use is defined as a relation between (the semantic representation of) a linguistic form and (the representation of) the speaker’s mental state: In the speaker’s state the sentence containing the relevant indefinite corresponds to a singular proposition. Specific interpretation is in a sense a derivative notion: It characterises the representation constructed by the hearer just in case he construes an indefinite as having been used specifically by the speaker, and builds his own representation accordingly. The representation language we employ is a descendant of the original DRT-language presented in Kamp and Reyle (1993). This framework is tailor-made for the representations of attitudes of cognitive agents (for a recent discussion see Kamp (2013)); in the analysis reported in the present paper it enables us to distinguish between (i) the representation of an utterance that is derived via (standard) linguistic analysis, and (ii)– (iii) the representations that the individual discourse participants have or construct for this utterance. The key concept of the analysis is the notion of an anchored entity representation: Anchored entity representations are constituents of mental states that are causally linked, via their anchors, to the entities that they represent. In general, when a speaker uses a noun phrase to refer to an entity represented by one of her entity representations and thereby activates an entity representation in the mind of the hearer, the anchor of the hearer’s representation, ERH , will often be structurally different from that of the speaker’s own entity representation ERS, although normally the two representations will be coreferential. There will be a structural difference in particular when the speaker refers to the entity represented by ERS through making a specific use of an indefinite noun phrase. If the hearer takes her to have used the indefinite specifically, he will construct an entity representation ERH whose anchor links it to its referent as the entity represented by the speaker’s representation ERS. Anchors of this type are called ‘vicarious anchors’. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the linguistic status of epistemic specificity. Data from English have been taken to suggest that specificity is an epiphenomenon, viz. that it need not be captured at the level of grammatical representation. But data from Romanian appear to suggest otherwise: The behaviour of Romanian indefinites marked with the Accusative preposition pe suggests that the specificity properties of these indefinites need to be marked at the level of (compositional) semantics, viz. at the level of those representations that are obtained directly from syntactic input. Our (tentative) conclusion is that the linguistic status of specific indefinites can be subject to cross-linguistic variation. Preface This paper is the result of reduction twice over. The ‘grandmother’ document was put together for a course on indefinites that we offered at the European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information in Helsinki in 2001. These notes cover the range of different uses of indefinites from specificity all the way to those that the literature often treats as cases of incorporation. The first 1 half of these notes, concerned just with specific indefinites, we subsequently revised and expanded, so much so that it has grown into a book length manuscript, and is thus is no longer suitable as a journal article. The present paper covers part of the contents of the latter manuscript. It focuses on our own proposal for an analysis and formal treatment of what Farkas has termed ‘epistemic specificity’ (Farkas (1996)). The proposal builds on a DRT-based account of propositional attitudes and attitude reports, of which an unpublished manuscript has been circulated since the mid-nineties. A German translation of most of this document can be found in Kamp (2003). A somewhat condensed version, but with additional material on shared attitudes, which is relevant to the proposal in this paper, is part of Kamp et al. (2011). For an early, less formal version of most of the core ideas see Kamp (1990). In recent years the representation formalism we will be using has been referred to as ‘MSDRT’ (for ‘Mental State DRT’).

中文翻译：

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传播理论视角的认知特异性

本文提供了基于DRT的认知特异性分析。按照Farkas（1996），我们区分了骨特异性，部分特异性和认知特异性。在第1节中论证了特异性的三个主要变体是彼此不可还原的之后，本文将重点放在认知特异性上。在分析认识论上的特定不定式时，我们区分了特定用途和特定解释。特定的使用被定义为语言形式（的语义表示）和说话者的心理状态（的表示）之间的关系：在说话者的状态中，包含相关不定词的句子对应于一个单数命题。从某种意义上讲，特定的解释是派生的概念：它描述了听众构造的表示形式，以防万一他将不确定性视为由说话者专门使用，并据此建立自己的表示形式。我们采用的表示语言是Kamp and Reyle（1993）中提出的原始DRT语言的后代。该框架是针对认知主体态度的表达量身定制的（有关最近的讨论，请参见Kamp（2013））；在本文所报告的分析中，它使我们能够区分（i）通过（标准）语言分析得出的话语表示，和（ii）–（iii）各个话语参与者具有或构造的表示对于这种话语。分析的关键概念是锚定实体表示的概念：锚定的实体表示是精神状态的组成部分，它们通过其锚因果关系链接到它们所表示的实体。通常，当说话者使用名词短语来指代由其一个实体表示形式表示的实体，从而在听者心中激活一个实体表示形式时，该听者表示形式的锚点ERH通常在结构上与说话者自己的实体表示形式的ERS，尽管通常这两种表示形式都是核心的。特别是当说话者通过特定使用不定名词短语来指代ERS所代表的实体时，会有结构上的差异。如果听众带她使用了不确定词，他将构建实体表示形式ERH，其锚将其链接到作为由演讲者表示形式ERS表示的实体的参照对象。这种类型的锚称为“各种锚”。本文最后简要讨论了认知特异性的语言地位。来自英语的数据已被认为暗示特异性是一种现象。它不需要在语法表示层次上被捕获。但是来自罗马尼亚语的数据似乎暗示了其他问题：用不加修饰语介词pe标记的罗马尼亚不定式的行为表明，这些不定式的特殊性需要在（组成）语义层次上进行标记，即。直接从句法输入中获得的表示形式。我们的（初步）结论是，特定不定词的语言状态可能会受到跨语言变化的影响。前言本文是两次减少的结果。我们将“祖母”文件整理成一门不定式课程，该课程由我们在2001年赫尔辛基的欧洲逻辑，语言和信息暑期学校提供。这些注释涵盖了不定式的各种用法，从特殊性一直到文献经常将其视为合并案例。这些注释的前半部分仅涉及特定的不确定性，我们随后对其进行了修订和扩展，以至于它已成长为书本长度的手稿，因此不再适合用作期刊文章。本文涵盖了后一手稿的部分内容。它集中在我们自己的建议上，以分析和正式对待法卡斯所说的“流行病特异性”（Farkas（1996））。该提案建立在基于DRT的命题态度和态度报告的基础上，自90年代中期以来，一直未分发手稿。可以在Kamp（2003）中找到此文档大部分内容的德语翻译。Kamp等人的一部分是一个精简的版本，但其中包含与本白皮书中的建议相关的关于共同态度的其他材料。（2011）。有关大多数核心思想的早期，非正式形式，请参见Kamp（1990）。近年来，我们将使用的代表形式主义被称为“ MSDRT”（对于“精神状态DRT”）。该提案建立在基于DRT的命题态度和态度报告的基础上，自90年代中期以来，一直未分发手稿。可以在Kamp（2003）中找到此文档大部分内容的德语翻译。Kamp等人的一部分是一个精简的版本，但其中包含与本白皮书中的建议相关的关于共同态度的其他材料。（2011）。有关大多数核心思想的早期，非正式形式，请参见Kamp（1990）。近年来，我们将使用的代表形式主义被称为“ MSDRT”（对于“精神状态DRT”）。该提案建立在基于DRT的命题态度和态度报告的基础上，自90年代中期以来，一直未分发手稿。可以在Kamp（2003）中找到此文档大部分内容的德语翻译。Kamp等人的一部分是一个精简的版本，但其中包含与本白皮书中的建议相关的关于共同态度的其他材料。（2011）。有关大多数核心思想的早期，非正式形式，请参见Kamp（1990）。近年来，我们将使用的代表形式主义被称为“ MSDRT”（对于“精神状态DRT”）。但与共享的态度有关的其他材料与本文的建议有关，是Kamp等人的一部分。（2011）。有关大多数核心思想的早期，非正式形式，请参见Kamp（1990）。近年来，我们将使用的代表形式主义被称为“ MSDRT”（对于“精神状态DRT”）。但与共享的态度有关的其他材料与本文的建议有关，是Kamp等人的一部分。（2011）。有关大多数核心思想的早期，非正式形式，请参见Kamp（1990）。近年来，我们将使用的代表形式主义被称为“ MSDRT”（对于“精神状态DRT”）。