The standard grammatical theory of scalar implicature, as envisioned by Chierchia (2004), Fox (2007), and Chierchia, Fox, and Spector (2012), posits that scalar implicatures are derived in grammar, as a matter semantics, rather than pragmatically, as an implicature rooted in Grice’s maxim of quantity. Ignorance inferences, by contrast, e.g. those associated with plain disjunctive sentences, are derived pragmatically, as quantity implicatures. More generally, the standard theory predicts that for any utterance S and any relevant proposition φ which isn’t entailed, and whose negation isn’t entailed, by S, S gives rise to an inference of speaker ignorance about φ. We argue that this prediction is wrong: it fails to explain the contrast in ignorance inferences associated with at least (which obligatorily implies ignorance) vs. more than (which doesn’t) (Geurts and Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010, 2015). The problem is that, without stipulating restrictions on which propositions are relevant, the theory overgenerates ignorance inferences across the board. We argue that the solution is to close relevance under belief (if φ is relevant, then it’s also relevant whether the speaker believes φ). This move has the effect that ignorance inferences, like scalar implicatures, can only be derived in grammar, via a covert belief operator of the sort proposed by Meyer (2013) and discussed further by Fox (2016). The maxim of quantity, we show, then no longer enriches the meaning of an utterance, per se, but rather acts as a filter on what can be relevant in an utterance context. In particular, certain alternatives (of certain utterances) are shown to be incapable of being relevant in any context where the maxim of quantity is active — a property we dub obligatory irrelevance. We argue that obligatory irrelevance provides the key to understanding the contrast in ignorance inferences exhibited by at least vs. more than. We also argue that translating our proposal into neo-Gricean terms, if at all possible, would yield a conceptually less appealing and empirically less adequate theory.

中文翻译：

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强制无关性与无知推论的计算

Chierchia（2004），Fox（2007）和Chierchia，Fox和Spector（2012）所设想的标准的标量隐含语法理论认为，标量隐含性是从语法上得出的，这是从语义上而不是从务实的角度出发，根植于格里斯（Greice）的数量准则。相比之下，无知推论，例如与简单的析取句相关的推论，是作为数量含义而实用地得出的。更普遍的说，标准理论预测，对于S所不涉及的任何话语S和任何相关命题φ，S都会导致说话人对φ的无知。我们认为这种预测是错误的：它无法解释至少（强制性地表示无知）与无知相关的无知推理的对比。超过（不是）（Geurts and Nouwen 2007; Nouwen 2010，2015）。问题在于，在没有规定与哪些命题相关的限制的情况下，该理论在各个方面过度生成了无知推论。我们认为解决方案是在信念下关闭关联（如果φ相关，那么说话者是否相信φ也相关）。此举产生的效果是，无知推理（例如标量蕴含）只能通过语法（由Meyer（2013）提出并由Fox（2016）进一步讨论）的隐式信念算子得出。我们显示出数量的最大值，然后本身不再充实发声的含义，而是充当对发声上下文中相关内容的过滤。特别是，（某些话语的）某些替代方法在数量最大化的任何情况下都被证明是不相关的-我们认为这是强制性的不相关属性。我们认为，强制性的不相关性是理解至少与大于显示的无知推理的对比的关键。我们还争辩说，如果有可能，将我们的建议翻译成新的希腊语术语，将产生一个理论上吸引力较小，经验不足的理论。