Capacity auctions with reliability options are seen as a promising possibility to reduce the investment risk for electricity generators as well as to set incentives for sufficient investments in generating capacity. However, there has been little attention so far on the interaction between a capacity market and an increasing share of renewable energy. In a first step we formalize the functioning of capacity auctions with reliability options. We improve their incentive regulation to allow effective incentives for sufficient investments. In a second step we study, with comparative statics, how an increasing share of renewable energy, varying carbon emission costs and the existing capacity mix influence the outcome of a capacity auction. For an increasing share of renewable energy, capacity auctions direct investments to more flexible power plants. This opposes the merit order effect of renewable energy which is observed at energy-only markets. A capacity market can therefore prevent missing flexibility feared at energy-only markets as a result of an increasing share of renewable energy.

中文翻译：

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关于可再生能源份额不断增加的容量市场的运作

带有可靠性选项的容量拍卖被认为是降低发电机投资风险以及为充分投资于发电能力设置激励措施的有前途的可能性。但是，迄今为止，对容量市场与可再生能源份额的增长之间的相互作用鲜有关注。第一步，我们使用可靠性选项对能力拍卖的功能进行形式化。我们完善了他们的激励规定，以便为有效的投资提供有效的激励。在第二步中，我们使用比较静态变量研究可再生能源份额的增加，碳排放成本的变化以及现有的容量组合如何影响容量拍卖的结果。为了增加可再生能源的份额，容量拍卖会将投资直接投资到更灵活的发电厂。这与仅在能源市场上观察到的可再生能源的功绩效应相反。因此，容量市场可以防止由于可再生能源份额的增加而在纯能源市场上担心缺少灵活性。