In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “advance” as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “retreat” as the playing field levels.

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赞成或多或少？公司游说对国有企业的优惠待遇

在经合组织和许多其他国家，国有公营企业通常会获得各种形式的排他性优惠待遇，这些优惠直接影响所有公司的利润，从而促使公司游说政治家。使用共同代理方法，我们表明当公有企业的国家所有权足够低时，即私有化过程已充分推进，公司游说会促进优惠待遇，导致公有企业在竞争环境中倾向于自己时倾向于“前进” 。相反，当国有企业所有权较高时，公司游说会减少优惠待遇，导致公有企业在竞争环境中“撤退”。