With the growing size of the interbank financial market, it is often argued that capital regulations for large wholesale banks should be more stringent than for small retail banks. This study constructs a general equilibrium model incorporating both wholesale and retail banks under capital regulation to discuss whether wholesale banks should face tighter leverage restrictions than retail banks. The simulations assuming various degrees of capital regulation on wholesale and retail banks show that stringent capital requirements for wholesale banks improve financial stability. The inefficiencies brought about by capital regulations are mitigated as a result of agents’ anticipation of stability. In contrast, capital regulations on both wholesale and retail banks destabilize the interbank market, because a large drop in asset prices reduces expectations that wholesale banks will be able to meet their obligations. These results imply that the stabilizing effect of capital regulation dominates inefficient asset allocation and thus provide theoretical support for the recent regulatory reforms imposing tight capital regulations on large influential financial institutions.

中文翻译：

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严格的资本要求对大型金融机构的影响

随着银行间金融市场规模的不断扩大，人们常常认为，大型批发银行的资本监管应比小型零售银行更为严格。本研究构建了一个在资本管制下将批发银行和零售银行都纳入的一般均衡模型，以讨论批发银行是否应比零售银行面临更严格的杠杆限制。假设批发和零售银行有不同程度的资本监管的模拟结果表明，批发银行对资本的严格要求提高了金融稳定性。由于代理商对稳定性的期望，减轻了资本法规带来的效率低下。相反，针对批发和零售银行的资本法规破坏了银行间市场的稳定性，因为资产价格的大幅下跌降低了对批发银行将能够履行其义务的期望。这些结果表明，资本监管的稳定作用主导着效率低下的资产配置，从而为最近的监管改革提供了理论依据，这些改革对有影响力的大型金融机构实施了严格的资本监管。