This study examines the effects of environmental enforcement on labor employed by regulated facilities. The empirical analysis uses panel data from an original survey of chemical manufacturing facilities regulated under the Clean Water Act. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we distinguish between two types of labor employed by regulated facilities: labor dedicated to regulatory compliance (“environmental labor”) and labor dedicated to production (“production labor”). Second, we estimate the effect of environmental enforcement on production labor. Environmental enforcement seeks to induce compliance with Clean Water Act restrictions, i.e., discharge limits, by prompting greater environmental management. However, environmental labor and production labor play different roles regarding environmental management. Consistent with this difference, our empirical analysis explores the two labor outcomes separately. Our study explores various forms of enforcement, interpreted broadly to include monitoring inspections and enforcement actions, e.g., fines (“government interventions”). In general, our empirical results reveal that government interventions do not affect environmental labor, yet negatively affect production labor.

中文翻译：

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环保执法对劳工的影响：环保工人和生产工人

这项研究考察了环境执法对受监管设施雇用的劳动力的影响。经验分析使用了根据《清洁水法》监管的化学生产设施原始调查的面板数据。这项研究通过两种方式为文献做出了贡献。首先，我们区分受监管的设施雇用的两种类型的劳动：专用于法规遵从的劳动（“环境劳动”）和专用于生产的劳动（“生产劳动”）。其次，我们估计环境执法对生产劳动的影响。环保执法旨在通过促进更好的环境管理，促使其遵守《清洁水法》的限制，即排放限制。但是，环境劳动和生产劳动在环境管理方面起着不同的作用。与这种差异一致，我们的经验分析分别探讨了两种劳动成果。我们的研究探索了各种形式的执法，广泛地解释为包括监督检查和执法行动，例如罚款（“政府干预”）。总的来说，我们的经验结果表明，政府干预不会影响环境劳动，但会对生产劳动产生负面影响。