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What can deregulators deregulate? The case of electricity
Journal of Regulatory Economics ( IF 1.553 ) Pub Date : 2019-08-05 , DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09386-9
Tin Cheuk Leung , Kwok Ping Ping , Kevin K. Tsui

We revisit Stigler and Friedland’s (J Law Econ 5:1–16, 1962) seminal paper by examining how competitive generation affects prices, sustainability, and reliability in the electricity industry. Exploiting state and year variation in the introduction of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) that facilitate open access to transmission, we first show that wholesale market deregulation significantly increases the prevalence of independent power producers (IPPs). Using RTO membership as an instrument, we find that IPP entry fails to cut electricity prices paid by consumers. This non-result is also robust to using initial electricity tariffs as an instrument for changes in IPP in a long-difference specification. We provide suggestive evidence that the absence of consumer gain can be attributed to efficiency loss due to mandated divestiture of generation assets or simply higher upstream transaction costs. But, increased prevalence of IPPs is associated with more solar and hydropower, although the use of non-fossil fuel as a whole remains unchanged because less nuclear power is used. More IPPs, however, is also associated with less reliable electricity supply. A review of the origins of electricity deregulation suggests that this tradeoff between environmental sustainability and energy security is not likely to have been the major determinant of the deregulation. Rather than a pro-consumer deregulation, the regulatory change is perhaps more appropriately interpreted as a regulatory capture that benefits IPP entrants and existing energy marketers.

中文翻译:

放松管制者可以解除什么管制?用电情况

我们通过研究竞争性发电如何影响电力行业的价格,可持续性和可靠性,来回顾斯蒂格勒和弗里德兰德的著作(J Law Econ 5:1-16,1962)。在引入有助于开放式输电的区域输电组织(RTO)的情况下利用状态和年份的差异,我们首先表明批发市场的放松管制显着提高了独立发电商(IPP)的普及率。使用RTO成员资格作为一种工具,我们发现IPP进入并不能降低消费者支付的电价。这种无结果对于将初始电价用作改变长差异规范中IPP的工具也很有效。我们提供了有力的证据,表明缺乏消费者利益可归因于强制性剥离发电资产或仅仅更高的上游交易成本所导致的效率损失。但是,尽管由于减少了核能的使用,整个非化石燃料的使用量保持不变,但IPP的普及与更多的太阳能和水力发电有关。然而,更多的IPP也与电力供应不可靠相关。对电力管制放松的根源的审查表明,环境可持续性与能源安全之间的这种折衷不太可能是管制放松的主要决定因素。与其说是放松对消费者的放松管制,不如说是将管制变更更恰当地解释为有利于IPP进入者和现有能源销售商的管制俘获。
更新日期:2019-08-05
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