Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.

中文翻译：

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不确定性下的光纤投资和访问：长期合同，风险溢价和访问选项

受监管的接入方案对下一代网络的投资和进入形成了激励。与标准获取定价相比，我们在一般的双头垄断环境下研究溢价，获取选择权或长期合同是否以及如何改善这些激励措施。前两个是这样做的：风险溢价保证最高的覆盖率，同时扭曲零售价格。访问选项可保护零售业的竞争，但在最昂贵的区域中无效。另一方面，长期合同几乎没有扩大覆盖范围的空间，因为它们加剧了零售竞争。