Over the past decade, federal, state and local governments have restricted the types and uses of information in hiring and promotion decisions. Examples include the banning of credit reports and criminal records. This paper presents a simple microeconomic model of a competitive labor market and studies the economic effects of information bans. The key trade off is between allocative efficiency and helping a labor type with an undesirable characteristic. We compare information bans to direct subsidies. Moreover, we discuss the case where the ban creates negative feedback on the perceptions of firms considering workers of the bad type.

中文翻译：

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在招聘决定中禁止信息

在过去的十年中，联邦，州和地方政府在雇用和晋升决策中限制了信息的类型和使用。例子包括禁止信用报告和犯罪记录。本文提出了竞争性劳动力市场的简单微观经济学模型，并研究了信息禁令的经济影响。关键的权衡是在分配效率和帮助具有不良特征的劳动力类型之间。我们将信息禁令与直接补贴进行比较。此外，我们讨论了该禁令对考虑不良工人的公司的看法产生负面反馈的情况。