Infrequent but turbulent sovereign defaults on domestic creditors were a “forgotten history” in macroeconomics. We propose a Bewley model in which the government chooses debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives versus the benefits of debt for self-insurance, liquidity, and risk-sharing. A feedback mechanism links debt issuance, the debt distribution, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Eurozone data, the model is consistent with key long-run and debt-crisis statistics. Defaults are rare and preceded by surging debt and spreads. Debt sells at the risk-free price most often but lack of commitment cuts sustainable debt sharply.

很少但动荡的主权债务人对国内债权人的违约是宏观经济学的“被遗忘的历史”。我们提出了一个Bewley模型，其中政府通过平衡分配激励与债务对自保，流动性和风险分担的收益之间的关系来选择债务和对国内外债权人的违约。反馈机制将债务发行，债务分配，违约决定和风险溢价联系在一起。该模型已根据欧元区数据进行了校准，与关键的长期和债务危机统计数据保持一致。违约很罕见，并且债务和利差激增。债务最经常以无风险的价格出售，但缺乏承诺会大大削减可持续债务。