Concerns about the rule of law in the modern administrative state are not only the result of our current legal system, but of our historical experience. Our legal tradition provides us with no precedents for imposing rules on executive power or authority. English kings created two institutions, the common law courts and the legislature (Parliament), in part to extend his control over the nobles. These institutions gradually acquired independent power and reduced the authority of the monarchy. They did not do so, however, by imposing controls, or standards of behavior, on the king's executive authority. Rather, they reduced the scope his authority, taking command of one field after another. In the process of defining and justifying their newly developed roles, the courts and the legislature established procedures and decision-making standards for their own actions that embodied the rule of law.Thus we, as heirs to English legal and constitutional thought, know how to impose the rule of law on judicial and administrative action. But we have not inherited any standards for executive action; our historical experience teaches us how to limit its scope but not how to control its content. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) reflects this historical and cultural lacuna. It contains elaborate standards for adjudication, modeled on judicial procedure, and at least rudimentary standards for rulemaking, modeled on legislative procedure. But it provides no standards for executive action, and in fact, does not even recognize such action as a category. We know that category as informal adjudication, an obvious misnomer that does not appear in the language of the Act, but has been concocted by observers based on the Act's implicit structure. The unsolved problem in administrative law is to impose rules on action that falls within that category, that is, executive action, without impairing government’s ability to act. Methods for doing so could include substantive standards such as rationality, imposed by a revised APA and enforced by courts, or new supervisory institutions such as an the ombudsperson, or new procedural requirements, such as a revision of the APA notice and comment provisions that would be based on the concept of policy making rather than legislation by elected representatives.

中文翻译：

---

行政行动：其历史，困境和可能的补救措施

对现代行政国家法治的担忧不仅是我们当前法律制度的结果，也是我们历史经验的结果。我们的法律传统为我们没有施加关于执行权或权力的规则的先例。英国国王创建了两个机构，普通法法院和立法机关（议会），部分是为了扩大对贵族的控制。这些机构逐渐获得了独立的权力，并降低了君主制的权威。但是，他们没有通过对国王的行政当局施加控制或行为标准来这样做。相反，他们缩小了他的权限范围，接管了另一个领域。在定义和证明他们的新角色时，法院和立法机关为体现法治的自身行为制定了程序和决策标准。因此，作为英国法律和宪法思想的继承人，我们知道如何将法治强加于司法和行政行为。但是我们还没有继承任何执行行为的标准。我们的历史经验告诉我们如何限制其范围，而不是如何控制其内容。《行政诉讼法》（APA）反映了这一历史和文化缺陷。它包含以司法程序为模型的详尽的裁决标准，以及至少以立法程序为模型的基本规则制定标准。但是它没有提供执行行为的标准，实际上，甚至没有将这种行为视为一个类别。我们知道该类别为非正式裁决，一种明显的误称，并未以该法案的语言出现，但已由观察员根据该法案的隐含结构加以炮制。行政法中尚未解决的问题是对属于该类别的行动（即行政行动）施加规则，而不会损害政府的行动能力。这样做的方法可以包括由修订的APA强制实施并由法院强制执行的实质性标准，例如合理性，或由监察员等新的监督机构执行，或新的程序要求，例如对APA通知和评论条款的修订，基于决策的概念，而不是民选代表的立法。行政法中尚未解决的问题是对属于该类别的行动（即行政行动）施加规则，而不会损害政府的行动能力。这样做的方法可以包括由修订的APA强制实施并由法院强制执行的实质性标准，例如合理性，或由监察员等新的监督机构执行，或新的程序要求，例如对APA通知和评论条款的修订，基于决策的概念，而不是民选代表的立法。行政法中尚未解决的问题是对属于该类别的行动（即行政行动）施加规则，而不会损害政府的行动能力。这样做的方法可以包括由修订的APA强制实施并由法院强制执行的实质性标准，例如合理性，或由监察员等新的监督机构执行，或新的程序要求，例如对APA通知和评论条款的修订，基于决策的概念，而不是民选代表的立法。