This article presents the situation of ‘Missing Investment Treaties’ (MITs), defined as those International Investment Agreements (IIAs) that have been concluded by States, but their texts (and in some cases their existence) are not publicly available or incomplete. In order to determine the number of MITs, we examined the text and language availability of IIAs concluded by countries, that are publicly available, and we complemented that information with country-specific searches from international, governmental and private sources. In turn, the article explores possible explanations to this State's behaviour, using the following questions as guidelines: Why would countries sign agreements that are supposedly negotiated to promote, protect or liberalise foreign investment without making those texts available? If a text of an IIA is publicly available, does it correspond to the language of both contracting parties, only one of them, or of a third country? Is it possible to achieve IIAs' objectives if the text of the treaty is not available, or is it available only in one language? Might there be other reasons to sign these agreements?

中文翻译：

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缺少投资条约

本文介绍了“缺失投资条约”(MITs) 的情况，其定义为各国缔结的国际投资协定 (IIA)，但其文本（在某些情况下它们的存在）不公开或不完整。为了确定 MIT 的数量，我们检查了各国缔结的公开可用的国际投资协定的文本和语言可用性，并通过国际、政府和私人来源的针对特定国家的搜索来补充这些信息。反过来，文章以下列问题为指导，探讨了对该国行为的可能解释：为什么各国会签署据称是为了促进、在不提供这些文本的情况下保护或放开外国投资？如果 IIA 的文本是公开的，它是否对应于缔约方的语言，只有其中一个，还是第三国的语言？如果条约文本不可用，或者仅以一种语言提供，是否有可能实现国际投资协定的目标？签署这些协议可能还有其他原因吗？