In 1941, John Maynard Keynes noted that “[n]othing is more certain than that the movement of capital funds must be regulated; which in itself will involve far-reaching departures from laissez-faire arrangements”. 77 years later, the international regulation of capital movements appears everything but certain. The purpose of this paper is to review the IMF’s jurisdiction over the capital account. While the IMF has become the most important international financial institution (IFIs) to oversee international flows of capital, it has surprisingly little formal power to influence its members’ capital flow measures (CFMs). This paper revisits the case for as well as against strengthening the IMF’s (formal) jurisdiction over countries’ capital account. We also link this debate to the ongoing discussion in policy-making circles. Moving forward, the IMF could play more central and powerful a role in determining what capital account policies support or undermine the stability of its members and the system as a whole. As we show in this paper, while reluctant to legally empower the Fund, states have endorsed a gradual expansion of its bilateral and multilateral surveillance mandate, thereby implicitly favouring “soft” law over “hard” law solutions. An important question is thus whether the Fund’s surveillance functions and the mechanisms of peer pressure and moral suasion that its efficacy relies upon, are adequate means for the IMF to fulfil its mandate? Without providing an exhaustive answer, the paper provides an overview of the debate and makes some suggestions on the way forward.

中文翻译：

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基金组织对资本账户的管辖权——审查监督在管理跨境资本流动中的作用

1941 年，约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯 (John Maynard Keynes) 指出，“没有什么比必须对资本资金的流动进行监管更确定；这本身将涉及对自由放任安排的深远背离”。77 年后，资本流动的国际监管似乎万事俱备。本文的目的是审查基金组织对资本账户的管辖权。尽管 IMF 已成为监督国际资本流动的最重要的国际金融机构 (IFI)，但令人惊讶的是，它几乎没有影响其成员资本流动措施 (CFM) 的正式权力。本文重新审视了支持和反对加强 IMF 对各国资本账户的（正式）管辖权的理由。我们还将这场辩论与决策圈正在进行的讨论联系起来。向前进，IMF 可以在决定哪些资本账户政策支持或破坏其成员和整个体系的稳定性方面发挥更重要和更强大的作用。正如我们在本文中所展示的，虽然各国不愿在法律上赋予基金组织权力，但各国已同意逐步扩大其双边和多边监督任务，从而暗中支持“软”法而非“硬”法解决方案。因此，一个重要的问题是，基金组织的监督职能以及其效力所依赖的同行压力和道德劝告机制是否是基金组织履行其使命的适当手段？在没有提供详尽答案的情况下，本文概述了辩论并就前进的道路提出了一些建议。