The Inter-American Court’s negative reputation as a judicial activist is often contrasted with its influence in the Inter-American Human Rights System. Despite often issuing broad judgments, the Court has remained a reference and a standard for human rights in the region. This article aims to examine this phenomenon by examining the Court’s institutional powers. The article claims that the Court’s tendency towards judicial activism does not contradict its functions, but rather reflects domestic judicial tendencies and cultures. Domestic judicial cultures and states’ interactions with the Court provide context for the interpretation of its powers and its role in the Inter-American System. The article, therefore, suggests that argumentative legal exchange engaged by the Court and Member States is a healthy way of promoting mutual accountability, while maintaining flexibility for adaptations by both parties and preserving the internal coherence of the regional system. 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N The Inter-American Court has played an important role in the development of human rights in the American region. By adopting an active approach in developing human rights in the region, the Court not only held states accountable for human rights violations, but also provided them with the judicial and legal apparatus to ensure that they needed to develop the regional human rights system. The Court’s self-proclaimed mission to contribute to the progressive development of human rights was often accomplished by adopting expansive interpretations of legal rules and concepts in the American Convention on Human Rights. The broad judgments over issues that had not been initially covered by the American Convention, including the reforms in domestic legal proceedings, laws and constitutions, attracted mixed reviews: while some commentators praised the Court for the much-needed impulse for the development of human rights in the region, others considered the * PhD Candidate at the Grotius Centre for International Legal Studies, Leiden University. Email: p.baldini. miranda.da.cruz@law.leidenuniv.nl. I would like to thank Prof. Eric de Brabandere and Dr. Mamadou Hébié for the support and comments when preparing this piece. 1 See, eg Armin von Bogdandy and others, ‘Ius Constitutionale Comune en América Latina: A Regional Approach to Transformative Constitutionalism’ (2016) MPIL Research Paper Series No 2016-21. VC The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 69 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2020, 11, 69–90 doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idaa002 Advance Access Publication Date: 27 January 2020 Article D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jids/article-ct/11/1/69/5716383 by gest on 02 April 2020 Court aggressive and anti-democratic. However, what both sides seemed to agree is that the Court has been constantly pushing the limits of its own powers and jurisdiction. Despite the consensus about the Inter-American Court of Human Rights operating outside its mandate, Member States seem to nevertheless have a reasonable record of compliance with the Court’s judgments—although, as we will see further, states may justifiably refuse compliance under certain circumstances. As noted by Baillet, the reason why some states take longer to comply with judgments issued by the Court is not because they reject the Court’s judgments, but rather because many of them require policy adaptations or legal reform, both of which take time. But why they do not question these judgments, if the Court seems to be acting outside the scope of its own powers? In this article, I examine the limits of powers of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and how they can justify the Court’s law-making and shaping Member States’ domestic policies. I focus on analysing the Court’s functions and the role it was designed to fulfil in the international society. States created international courts to perform certain functions and fulfil societal roles that often go beyond the settlement of disputes among parties and include more systemic goals, such as harmonization of rules or development of law in certain contexts. The functions and roles of international tribunals are the product of institutional design which is expressed in their constitutive documents and consent to jurisdiction granted by Member States. These documents are norms that guide the actions and powers of tribunals in their work. As such, they must be interpreted in accordance with the legal context in which that tribunal is developed, and based on the interactions and reciprocal legal justification between the court and its Member States (Section 2). I, therefore, propose a phenomenological interpretation of the Court’s mandate and powers. I defend that one of the reasons why the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is more creative than other similar tribunals is because its Member States encourage it to do so by complying with its judgments. Moreover, whenever 2 See, eg Ezequiel Malarino, ‘Judicial Activism, Punitivism, and Supranationalization: Illiberal and Antidemocratic Tendencies of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 665; Pablo Contreras, ‘Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil’ (Corte IdH Blog, 27 August 2012) accessed 14 November 2019; Christina Binder, ‘The Prohibition of Amnesties by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1203. 3 Cecilia M Bailliet, ‘Measuring Compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Ongoing Challenge of Judicial Independence in Latin America’ (2013) 31 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 477, 480. 4 On roles played by international courts and tribunals, see Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’ (12 June 2012) ACIL Research Paper No 2012-10; Karen J Alter, ‘The Multiple Roles of international Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review’ (2012) Faculty Working Papers Paper 212 accessed 14 November 2019; Eric A Posner and John C Yoo, ‘Judicial Independence in International Tribunals’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 8; Laurence R Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo’ (2005) 93 California Law Review 899. 70 Journal of International Dispute Settlement D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jids/article-ct/11/1/69/5716383 by gest on 02 April 2020 Member States believe that the Court extrapolates its mandate by issuing illegal judgments, Member States respond by legally rejecting those judgments (Section 3). My goal in this article is not to identify a specific limit for the powers of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. Instead, I aim to trace an institutional profile of the Court and explain why the Court seems to have been unusually successful in its attempts to engaging in law-making. I do so by examining the functional attributions set in the Court’s constitutive documents and Member States’ consent to the Court’s jurisdiction in light of interactions between the Court and its Member States in the context of cases. 2 . I N T E R N A T I O N A L T R I B U N A L S I N G L O B A L S O C I E T Y One of the core functions of tribunals is to solve disputes that are brought to them. However, not all disputes are made the same. And neither are tribunals. Tribunals can be specifically designed to deal with certain types of disputes within certain realities. Hence, tribunals, both domestic and international, differ in terms of the issues they deal with, what kinds of evidence and procedures they can collect, on whether judges should be more active or reactive, and what kinds of solutions they can provide. These characteristics are twofold: on the one hand, they represent the institutional design and the powers of the tribunal and, on the other hand, those characteristics also limit their actions (Section 2.A). Although tribunals’ powers are determined by their constitutive instruments, the terms used are often vague and require interpretation. Tribunals are the first ones to conduct such interpretation on the limits of their own powers, through the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz. However, they are not the only ones to do so. Under the oversight of their constituents, tribunals’ powers are also interpreted by states, which interact with judgments and shape these interpretations along with courts (Section 2.B). A. Institutional Design and Tribunal Performance Tribunals, like any other institution, can be designed to fulfil different roles in a society. Although tribunals exist to settle disputes, there are different approaches that a tribunal can take towards solving disputes. In the beginning of the 20th century, Schmitt and Kelsen engaged in a long debate on what should be the role of constitutional courts in a domestic environment. The discussion revolved around whether the legal systems should be primarily controlled by legislative bodies or constitutional courts. Schmitt defended that tribunals should follow a private-oriented profile, where legislators were the designers and protagonists of legal systems. According to Schmitt, legislators should be presumed competent and capable of producing a coherent system where rules worked efficiently together to improve society. Hence, under Schmitt’s system, it was not necessary to have constitutional courts and judges 5 See Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen’s discussion on this matter in

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追踪者和开拓者：美洲人权法院的动态互动和制度设计

美洲法院作为司法活动家的负面声誉往往与其在美洲人权体系中的影响形成鲜明对比。尽管经常发布宽泛的判决，但该法院仍然是该地区人权的参考和标准。本文旨在通过考察法院的机构权力来考察这一现象。文章称，法院的司法积极主义倾向与其职能并不矛盾，而是反映了国内司法趋势和文化。国内司法文化和国家与法院的互动为解释其权力及其在美洲体系中的作用提供了背景。因此，该文章表明，法院和会员国进行的辩论性法律交流是促进相互问责的健康方式，同时保持双方适应的灵活性，并保持区域体系的内部一致性。1 . 引言 美洲法院在美洲地区的人权发展中发挥了重要作用。通过在该地区积极发展人权，法院不仅让国家对侵犯人权行为负责，而且还为它们提供了司法和法律机构，以确保它们需要发展地区人权体系。法院自诩为促进人权的逐渐发展做出贡献的使命通常是通过对《美洲人权公约》中的法律规则和概念进行广泛解释来实现的。对《美洲公约》最初未涵盖的问题的广泛判断，包括国内法律程序、法律和宪法的改革，引起了褒贬不一的评论：而一些评论家称赞法院为发展人权提供了急需的推动力在该地区，其他人认为 * 莱顿大学格劳秀斯国际法律研究中心的博士候选人。电子邮件：p.baldini。miranda.da.cruz@law.leidenuniv.nl。我要感谢 Eric de Brabandere 教授和 Mamadou Hébié 博士在准备这篇文章时给予的支持和评论。1 参见，例如 Armin von Bogdandy 等人，“IusConstitutionale Comune en América Latina：变革宪政的区域方法”（2016 年）MPIL 研究论文系列第 2016-21 号。VC 作者 2020。牛津大学出版社出版。这是一篇根据知识共享署名许可 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) 条款分发的开放获取文章，它允许在任何媒体中不受限制地重复使用、分发和复制，前提是原始作品被正确引用。69 Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 2020, 11, 69–90 doi: 10.1093/jnlids/idaa002 Advance Access Publication Date: 27 January 2020 Article D ow naded rom http/academ ic.p.com /jids/article-ct/11 /1/69/5716383 by gest 2020 年 4 月 2 日 法庭咄咄逼人和反民主。然而，双方似乎都同意的是，法院一直在不断推动自身权力和管辖权的极限。尽管就美洲人权法院在其职权范围之外运作达成共识，尽管如此，成员国似乎有遵守法院判决的合理记录——尽管我们将进一步看到，在某些情况下，国家可能有理由拒绝遵守。正如 Baillet 所指出的，一些州之所以需要更长的时间来遵守法院的判决，并不是因为他们拒绝了法院的判决，而是因为其中许多州需要政策调整或法律改革，这两者都需要时间。但如果法院似乎在其权力范围之外行事，他们为什么不质疑这些判决？在本文中，我考察了美洲人权法院的权力限制，以及它们如何证明该法院的立法和塑造会员国的国内政策是合理的。我专注于分析法院的职能以及它旨在在国际社会中发挥的作用。各国设立国际法院是为了履行某些职能​​和社会作用，这些作用往往超出解决当事人之间的争端，并包括更系统的目标，例如在某些情况下协调规则或制定法律。国际法庭的职能和作用是制度设计的产物，在其组成文件和成员国对管辖权的同意中得到表达。这些文件是指导法庭在其工作中的行动和权力的规范。因此，它们必须根据仲裁庭所在的法律背景进行解释，并基于法院与其成员国之间的相互作用和相互法律依据（第 2 节）。因此，我建议对法院的任务和权力进行现象学解释。我捍卫美洲人权法院比其他类似法庭更具创造性的原因之一是其成员国鼓励它遵守其判决。此外，每当 2 参见，例如 Ezequiel Malarino，“司法激进主义、惩罚主义和超国家化：美洲人权法院的非法和反民主趋势”（2012 年）12 国际刑法评论 665；Pablo Contreras，“Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil”（Corte IdH 博客，2012 年 8 月 27 日）提出对法院任务和权力的现象学解释。我捍卫美洲人权法院比其他类似法庭更具创造性的原因之一是其成员国鼓励它遵守其判决。此外，每当 2 参见，例如 Ezequiel Malarino，“司法激进主义、惩罚主义和超国家化：美洲人权法院的非法和反民主趋势”（2012 年）12 国际刑法评论 665；Pablo Contreras，“Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil”（Corte IdH 博客，2012 年 8 月 27 日）提出对法院任务和权力的现象学解释。我捍卫美洲人权法院比其他类似法庭更具创造性的原因之一是其成员国鼓励它遵守其判决。此外，每当 2 参见，例如 Ezequiel Malarino，“司法激进主义、惩罚主义和超国家化：美洲人权法院的非法和反民主趋势”（2012 年）12 国际刑法评论 665；Pablo Contreras，“Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil”（Corte IdH 博客，2012 年 8 月 27 日）2 参见，例如 Ezequiel Malarino，“司法激进主义、惩罚主义和超国家化：美洲人权法院的非法和反民主趋势”（2012 年）12 国际刑法评论 665；Pablo Contreras，“Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil”（Corte IdH 博客，2012 年 8 月 27 日）2 参见，例如 Ezequiel Malarino，“司法激进主义、惩罚主义和超国家化：美洲人权法院的非法和反民主趋势”（2012 年）12 国际刑法评论 665；Pablo Contreras，“Control de Convencionalidad Fuerte y Débil”（Corte IdH 博客，2012 年 8 月 27 日）2019 年 11 月 14 日访问；Christina Binder，“美洲人权法院禁止大赦”（2011 年）12 德国法律杂志 1203。3 Cecilia M Bailliet，“衡量对美洲人权法院的遵守情况：司法独立的持续挑战拉丁美洲”（2013 年）31 Nordic Journal of Human Rights 477, 480。4 关于国际法院和法庭所扮演的角色，见 Armin von Bogdandy 和 Ingo Venzke，“关于国际法院的职能：鉴于其新兴公众的评估权威”（2012 年 6 月 12 日）ACIL 研究论文第 2012-10 号；Karen J Alter，“国际法院和法庭的多重角色：执法、争端解决、宪法和行政审查”（2012 年）教师工作论文论文 2122019 年 11 月 14 日访问；Eric A Posner 和 John C Yoo，“国际法庭的司法独立”（2005 年）93 加利福尼亚法律评论 8；Laurence R Helfer 和 Anne-Marie Slaughter，“国家为何设立国际法庭：对 Posner 和 Yoo 教授的回应”（2005 年）93 加州法律评论 899. 70 国际争端解决期刊杂志，从 http/academ ic.p. com /jids/article-ct/11/1/69/5716383 by gest 2020 年 4 月 2 日 会员国认为法院通过发布非法判决来推断其授权，会员国通过合法驳回这些判决来回应（第 3 节）。我在本文中的目标不是确定美洲人权法院权力的具体限制。反而，我的目标是追溯法院的机构概况，并解释为什么法院在试图参与立法方面似乎异常成功。为此，我根据法院与其成员国在案件背景下的互动，审查了法院组成文件中规定的职能归属以及成员国对法院管辖权的同意。2 . 国际法庭单一社会 法庭的核心职能之一是解决提交给他们的争议。然而，并非所有的争议都是一样的。法庭也不是。可以专门设计法庭来处理特定现实中的特定类型的争议。因此，国内和国际法庭在处理的问题上有所不同，他们可以收集什么样的证据和程序，法官应该更积极还是更被动，他们可以提供什么样的解决方案。这些特征是双重的：一方面，它们代表了仲裁庭的制度设计和权力，另一方面，这些特征也限制了它们的行动（第 2.A 节）。尽管仲裁庭的权力由其组成文书决定，但所使用的术语往往含糊不清，需要进行解释。法庭是第一个通过kompetenz-kompetenz原则对自己的权力范围进行这种解释的人。然而，他们并不是唯一这样做的人。在其选民的监督下，法庭的权力也由国家解释，它们与判决相互作用并与法院一起塑造这些解释（第 2.B 节）。A. 机构设计和法庭绩效 法庭与任何其他机构一样，可以设计成在社会中扮演不同的角色。尽管存在仲裁庭来解决争端，但仲裁庭可以采取不同的方法来解决争端。20 世纪初，施密特和凯尔森就宪法法院在国内环境中的作用进行了长时间的辩论。讨论围绕法律制度是否应主要由立法机构或宪法法院控制。施密特辩称，法庭应该遵循面向私人的形象，其中立法者是法律制度的设计者和主角。根据施密特的说法，应该假定立法者有能力并有能力建立一个连贯的制度，使规则有效地协同工作以改善社会。因此，在施密特的制度下，没有必要设立宪法法院和法官 5 参见 Carl Schmitt 和 Hans Kelsen 在