This Article involves a systematic exploration of the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions in cases involving the actual structure of the democratic process itself. These “law of democracy” cases pose some of the most conceptually difficult and politically charged cases even for domestic courts, let alone for a supranational Court tasked with enforcing democratic rights across the diverse ways the member States have structured and institutionalized their democratic systems. In the Court’s doctrinal terms, the question is how much of a “margin of appreciation” the Court should recognize for the various member States to interpret and apply democratic rights in differing ways across their different systems of democracy. Focusing on the Court’s decisions regarding regulation of political advertising, access to the vote, and the spending of money to influence electoral outcomes, the Article concludes that the Court has recurringly in recent decades entered into these areas with bold initial decisions, only to be forced to back down in response to the powerful political backlash such interventions have spawned, particularly in certain member States. This pattern suggests that a supranational court has trouble mobilizing the political legitimacy required to sustain acceptance of its decisions involving such morally powerful issues such as how different countries structures their systems of self-governance.

中文翻译：

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超国家法院与民主法：欧洲人权法院

本文系统地探讨了欧洲人权法院在涉及民主程序本身实际结构的案件中的裁决。这些“民主法”案件构成了一些概念上最困难和政治上最复杂的案件，即使对于国内法院来说也是如此，更不用说对一个负责通过成员国构建和制度化其民主制度的各种方式来执行民主权利的超国家法院而言的。用法院的教义术语来说，问题是法院应该承认各成员国在其不同的民主制度中以不同方式解释和应用民主权利的“赞赏幅度”有多大。关注法院关于政治广告监管、投票权的决定，以及花费金钱来影响选举结果，文章得出的结论是，近几十年来，法院反复以大胆的初步决定进入这些领域，结果却被迫退缩以应对此类干预所产生的强大政治反弹，尤其是在某些成员国。这种模式表明，超国家法院难以调动必要的政治合法性，以维持其裁决被接受，这些裁决涉及诸如不同国家如何构建其自治系统等具有道德影响力的问题。只是为了应对此类干预所产生的强大政治反弹而被迫退缩，特别是在某些成员国。这种模式表明，超国家法院难以调动必要的政治合法性，以维持其裁决被接受，这些裁决涉及诸如不同国家如何构建其自治系统等具有道德影响力的问题。只是为了应对此类干预所产生的强大政治反弹而被迫退缩，特别是在某些成员国。这种模式表明，超国家法院难以调动必要的政治合法性，以维持其裁决被接受，这些裁决涉及诸如不同国家如何构建其自治系统等具有道德影响力的问题。