The essay critiques prevailing descriptions of investor-state arbitration (ISDS) that see this mechanism as a form of ‘public’ adjudication requiring exclusively ‘public law’ reforms going forward, culminating in, as the European Union has recently suggested in the course of negotiations for the investment chapter of the Trans-Atlantic Partnership, its replacement by a permanent international investment court in lieu of arbitration using party-appointed arbitrators. It is skeptical of the ostensible public/private divide and most of the ten reasons advanced in the literature, premised on that divide, for concluding that the international investment regime, and particularly ISDS, is public. It next critiques ten widely praised public law prescriptions for change to the regime or ISDS. It concludes with ten broad lessons for why ISDS, in its current form, is best viewed as a ‘hybrid’ between public and private.

中文翻译：

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投资者与国家之间的仲裁是“公开的”吗？

这篇文章批评了对投资者-国家仲裁 (ISDS) 的普遍描述，这些描述将这种机制视为一种“公共”裁决形式，要求进行专门的“公法”改革，最终结果是，正如欧盟最近在谈判过程中所建议的那样对于跨大西洋合作伙伴关系的投资章节，它被一个永久性的国际投资法院取代，以代替使用当事人指定的仲裁员进行仲裁。它对表面上的公共/私人鸿沟以及以这种鸿沟为前提的文献中提出的十大理由中的大多数持怀疑态度，即得出国际投资制度，尤其是 ISDS 是公开的结论。接下来，它批评了十项广受赞誉的公法规定，以改变体制或 ISDS。它总结了十个广泛的教训，说明为什么 ISDS，