Literature on the investment treaty regime has shown little interest in diplomatic interests and agendas as drivers of treaty negotiations. This contrasts with other work on international economic relations, such as the negotiation of preferential trade agreements. Our paper fills this gap through a multi-method approach. In line with other areas of economic diplomacy we show that strategic foreign policy considerations have driven some investment treaty negotiations. Secondly, we show that some diplomats have been successful in promoting investment treaties to further their own individual interests. Rooted in public choice theory, this second causal mechanism is often overlooked in literature on economic diplomacy.

中文翻译：

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外交官需要条约：投资体制中的外交议程和福利

关于投资条约制度的文献对作为条约谈判驱动力的外交利益和议程几乎没有兴趣。这与国际经济关系方面的其他工作形成对比，例如优惠贸易协定的谈判。我们的论文通过多种方法填补了这一空白。与经济外交的其他领域一样，我们表明战略外交政策考虑推动了一些投资条约谈判。其次，我们表明，一些外交官在促进投资条约以促进他们自己的个人利益方面取得了成功。根植于公共选择理论，这第二个因果机制在经济外交的文献中经常被忽视。