Systematic data about investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) are increasingly important to our understanding of modern relations between states and multinational corporations. This article updates Susan Franck’s ‘Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2007) and complements Thomas Schultz and Cedric Dupont’s ‘Investment Arbitration: Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study’ (2015). I use a political science lens to explore data on the modern incarnation of ISDS, from 1990 to 2014. The article addresses topics including: (i) the industry, nationality and other characteristics of arbitration filers; (ii) win, loss, settlement and annulment rates; and (iii) trends in amounts claimed and amounts awarded. It also serves to introduce the accompanying data set. A central takeaway is that users of the de facto ISDS regime are incredibly diverse. Nonetheless, both proponents and detractors of ISDS may find fodder for their positions in recent developments.

中文翻译：

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投资者与国家争端解决的最新趋势

关于投资者与国家争端解决 (ISDS) 的系统数据对于我们理解国家与跨国公司之间的现代关系越来越重要。本文更新了 Susan Franck 的“关于投资条约仲裁的实证评估索赔”（2007 年），并补充了 Thomas Schultz 和 Cedric Dupont 的“投资仲裁：促进法治还是过度授权投资者？定量实证研究”（2015 年）。我使用政治科学的视角来探索从 1990 年到 2014 年 ISDS 现代化身的数据。本文涉及的主题包括：(i) 仲裁提交人的行业、国籍和其他特征；(ii) 赢、输、结算和废止率；(iii) 索赔金额和判给金额的趋势。它还用于介绍随附的数据集。一个核心结论是事实上的 ISDS 制度的用户非常多样化。尽管如此，ISDS 的支持者和反对者都可能会在最近的事态发展中找到支持他们立场的素材。