This article examines the collegial dynamics within investment tribunals. I construct a qualitative typology of adjudicator-level interactions based on original interviews with arbitrators from over 90% of finalized investment arbitrations. I proceed in several steps. First, I present an empirical and theoretical background on investment arbitration governance. Second, I give an overview of my data collection and method. I then present eight ideal types of arbitrators, which vary by their tilt towards states and affinity for each other. I then consider 128 distinct tribunal combinations, for which I explore the implications for states. I conclude that collegial dynamics contribute to making awards more investor-friendly or fact specific. The article contributes to the judicial politics and judicialization literatures by providing a case study of collegial dynamics among a class of adjudicators that lack tenure.

中文翻译：

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黑匣子内部：投资法庭的合议模式

本文考察了投资法庭内的合议动态。我基于对来自 90% 以上的最终投资仲裁的仲裁员的原始采访，构建了仲裁员级互动的定性类型。我分几个步骤进行。首先，我介绍了投资仲裁治理的实证和理论背景。其次，我概述了我的数据收集和方法。然后，我介绍了八种理想的仲裁员类型，它们因对国家的倾向和彼此的亲和力而异。然后，我考虑了 128 种不同的法庭组合，并探讨了对各州的影响。我得出的结论是，学院动态有助于使奖励对投资者更友好或更具体。