Article 33 of the International Criminal Court Statute allows low-ranking perpetrators to - in exceptional cases - rely on the defence of superior orders. By doing so, Article 33 might be seen as an acknowledgement that within a specific context orders to commit international crimes might not always be manifest unlawful. Article 33(2), however, restricts the possibility to rely on this defence to perpetrators of war crimes and denies perpetrators of crimes against humanity and genocide a similar defence, since according to Article 33(2), such orders are considered always to be manifestly unlawful. This contribution questions whether such a distinction should be made. Many low-ranking perpetrators involved in such crimes by following superior orders seem to genuinely believe that they were doing the 'right thing'. This article seeks to explain how these perpetrators might have come to such a belief, and the challenge this might represent to the core principles which underpin the concept of individual criminal responsibility.

中文翻译：

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为什么严重的国际犯罪在低级别犯罪者看来可能并不“明显违法”

《国际刑事法院规约》第 33 条允许低级犯罪者——在特殊情况下——依靠上级命令的辩护。通过这样做，第 33 条可能被视为承认在特定情况下实施国际罪行的命令可能并不总是明显非法。然而，第 33 条第 2 款将这种抗辩的可能性限制在战争罪的实施者身上，并否认危害人类罪和种族灭绝罪的实施者也有类似的抗辩，因为根据第 33 条第 2 款，此类命令始终被认为是明显违法。这一贡献质疑是否应该做出这样的区分。许多服从上级命令参与此类犯罪的低级犯罪者似乎真的相信他们在做“正确的事情”。