Signaling theory has been widely used to explain phenomena in personnel selection processes. We investigate whether and how signaling occurs in family businesses’ intra-family CEO successor selection. We apply a multiple case study approach using data from twelve German family businesses. Our analysis affirms that hard-to-fake signals as well as costly signals are present in the intra-family CEO successor selection process. More interestingly, the specific context in family businesses influences the signaling game. Signaling occurs during a much longer timeframe compared to non-family businesses, signals are sent and perceived in the private (owner family) as well as in the family business context, and negative signals are utilized by family members to exclude themselves from the pool of potential successors. We derive several propositions that we integrate into a conceptual model and discuss the implications of our findings for theory and practice in the family and the non-family business contexts.

信号理论已被广泛用于解释人员选拔过程中的现象。我们调查家族企业的家族内CEO继任者选择中是否以及如何发生信号传递。我们使用来自12个德国家族企业的数据进行了多案例研究。我们的分析证实，家族内部CEO继任者选择过程中存在难以伪造的信号以及代价高昂的信号。更有趣的是，家族企业中的特定环境会影响信号游戏。与非家族企业相比，信号发生的时间要长得多，信号是在私人（所有者家庭）以及家族企业的环境中发送和感知的，家族成员利用负面信号将自己排除在家族企业之外。潜在的继任者。