Corporate adoption of politically contestable practices (e.g., sustainable forestry; cage‐free eggs) is increasingly common. In two studies, we empirically explore the relationship between corporate practices and subsequent public support for legislation mandating such practices. One hypothesis is that public support for new legislation decreases following corporate action because the private sector is perceived to be adequately managing the problem, thus obviating the need for a legislative response. A competing hypothesis is that public support for new legislation increases because people are prompted to recognize the issue in question as one in need of regulation. Our results suggest that announced changes to corporate practices can increase public support for legislation, but the effects differ depending on the political orientation of the perceiver. Legislators might fruitfully integrate corporate endorsements into public information efforts.

中文翻译：

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法规，公众态度和私人治理

公司采用政治上有争议的做法（例如，可持续林业，无笼蛋）越来越普遍。在两项研究中，我们从经验上探讨了公司行为与随后的公众对强制执行此类行为的立法的支持之间的关系。一种假设是，在公司采取行动之后，公众对新立法的支持会减少，因为人们认为私营部门已经在适当地解决问题，因此无需采取立法对策。一个相互竞争的假设是，公众对新立法的支持增加了，因为人们被提示将有关问题视为需要监管的问题。我们的结果表明，对公司行为的宣布变更可以增加公众对立法的支持，但是效果取决于感知者的政治取向。立法者可以将公司的认可有效地整合到公共信息工作中。