How would judges compose judicial panels, if they could? We focus on a procedure in the Supreme Court of Israel that allows each justice to compose three‐justice panels, collecting an original database of decisions in this procedure. The data reveal strong bias in justices’ panel composition. A Gini coefficient measuring the extent of inequality in each justice's panel composition, which runs between 0 (total equality) and 1 (total inequality), is 0.82 on average, which contradicts the random composition theory. The high variance in the choice of panel members contradicts the professional composition theory. The data support the idea that justices compose panels strategically, and accordingly the data uncover justices’ revealed preference for panel members. We use the data to depict the relationships within the Supreme Court of Israel, and identify three groups of justices. Lastly, we show that justices who were selected by the current Chief Justice under the above procedure, before she became Chief Justice, are more likely to sit on panel with her in ordinary hearings after she became Chief Justice. Since the Chief Justice has the legal authority to compose ordinary panels, this is also consistent with strategic panel composition.

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法官将如何组成司法小组？以色列最高法院的理论和证据

如果可以的话，法官将如何组成司法小组？我们关注以色列最高法院的一项程序，该程序允许每个大法官组成三级司法小组，收集有关该程序的原始判决数据库。数据显示，法官的组成存在很大偏见。衡量每个大法官小组组成不平等程度的基尼系数平均为0.82，该系数介于0（完全平等）和1（完全不平等）之间，这与随机构成理论相矛盾。小组成员选择的高度差异与专业构成理论相矛盾。数据支持大法官从战略上组成小组的想法，因此数据揭示了大法官对小组成员的偏爱。我们使用这些数据来描绘以色列最高法院内部的关系，并确定三大法官。最后，我们表明，现任首席大法官在成为首席大法官之前，按照上述程序选出的法官更有可能在她成为首席大法官后与她一起参加普通听证会。由于首席大法官拥有组成普通小组的法律权力，这也与战略小组的组成保持一致。