We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and​ board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm’s future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures.

我们研究了股东为应对产品市场日益加剧的竞争压力而在战略上允许弱化治理结构的程度。我们将竞争对手的收购视为冲击，增加了竞争产品市场中的威胁。我们发现，当存在更大的竞争威胁时，企业会采用更严格的法律规定。此外，具有高机构所有权的公司（尤其是由专门的投资者拥有的公司）以及薪酬委员会内部的董事会独立性特别具有侵略性，这与我们的理论一致，即侵略性行为代表股东的战略决策。最后，我们发现采用the定条款与公司的未来绩效之间存在正相关关系，但仅适用于相对严峻的竞争压力下的采用。