This paper investigate how the corporate (profit) tax rate affects the optimal degree of privatization in a mixed duopoly, while introducing a minimum profit constraint for the private firm. Firstly, we show that the profit tax rate directly affects the behavior of the partially privatized firm and affects the behavior of the private firm through strategic interaction. In addition, we investigate the relationship between the optimal privatization policy and corporate tax policy, and find that the optimal degree of privatization increases with the corporate tax rate, regardless of whether the constraint is binding. The optimal degree of privatization decreases (increases) with the foreign ownership share in the private firm if the constraint is ineffective (effective). This result suggests that a minimum profit constraint can be crucial in the optimal privatization policy.

中文翻译：

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私有化与企业税收政策的关系

本文研究了公司（利润）税率如何影响混合双头垄断中的最佳私有化程度，同时为私营公司引入了最小利润约束。首先，我们表明，利润税率直接影响部分私有化企业的行为，并通过战略互动影响私有企业的行为。此外，我们考察了最优私有化政策与企业税收政策之间的关系，发现无论约束条件是否具有约束力，私有化的最优程度都随着企业税率的增加而增加。如果约束无效（有效），私有化的最佳程度会随着外国在私营企业中的所有权份额而减少（增加）。