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On signaling disability in anonymous economic games
Journal of Economic Psychology ( IF 2.5 ) Pub Date : 2020-04-16 , DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102272
Sylvain Max , Gilles Grolleau , Rodolphe Perchot , Angela Sutan

We experimentally tested whether individuals behave differently when they interact with other individuals whose disability is salient in dictator and ultimatum games. We found that participants are more generous and fairer with disabled people, and that this behavior is not strategic. These effects are driven by the specific nature of the disability not by the difference per se. The evidence regarding the effect of acquired versus permanent disability is mixed.

Practitioner points:

People interact in a positive way with disabled people.

Managers can be tempted to use strategically disabled people in organizational contexts.



中文翻译:

关于匿名经济博弈中的残疾信号

我们实验性地测试了当个体与其他在独裁者和最后通dis游戏中具有明显残疾的个体互动时,他们的行为是否有所不同。我们发现参与者对残疾人更加慷慨和公平,而且这种行为不是战略性的。这些影响是由残疾的特殊性质驱动的,而不是由本身的差异驱动的。关于后天性残疾与永久性残疾影响的证据好坏参半。

从业人员要点:

人们与残疾人以积极的方式互动。

经理很容易在组织环境中使用具有战略意义的残疾人。

更新日期:2020-04-16
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